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Barnes: Welcome to Case in Point produced by the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School.  I'm your host, Steve Barnes.   
 
 In this episode we will be speaking with Paul Heaton, a senior 
fellow here at Pen Law, and the academic director of Pen Laws 
Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice.  An 
economist by training, his research aims to apply insights from 
economics to inform studies of crime, courts, and legal policy.   
 
 Today we will examine some of the key innovations in these areas 
from criminal justice reform to medical marijuana laws to help 
victims of mass violence may be compensated in the wake of 
attacks. 
 
 Thank you, Paul, for joining us.  It's a pleasure to have you here.  
So let's get right into it.  If you could, please, and since you're new 
to in law, talk a little bit please about some of your latest research.  
Your newest projects that you're working on. 
 
Paul Heaton:  Sure.  And thanks for having me, Steve.  The Quattrone Center is 
focused on taking a systems approach to thinking about the 
criminal justice system.  So you know often when we think about 
criminal justice issues it's in the context of a particular case, or a 
particular defendant.   
 
 And one of the things that we wanted to with the center is instead 
of focusing on individual cases, is important as those can be, to 
think about some of the larger systemic factors that that feeding 
into the outcomes in individual cases.  So a few of the areas of that 
I've been doing work recently included work on open file 
discovery.  So this is the process of exchanging information 
between prosecutors and defense attorneys prior to the adjudication 
of the case.  So that's one area, and there's been some interesting 
and innovative policies that have been adopted in a few places like 
Texas and North Carolina and we want to understand a little bit 
better what the impacts of those policies are. 
 
 I have some other work looking at different methods for providing 
defense counsel to indigent defendants.  So one trend that's in 
becoming more popular is so-called holistic indigent defendants.  
So one approach to a defense that involves pairing lawyers with 
social workers, with civil attorneys, that take a more kind of 
holistic view of the problems that a client might have, and have the 
attorneys – you know, be like the tip of the spear in trying to solve 
some of the problems that bring clients into contact with the 
criminal justice system to begin with.  So doing an empirical study 
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of how that approach compares to traditional indigent defendants 
in the Bronx.  And then some other work looking at community 
policing and its impact on crime. 
 
 So a fairly broad set of topics, but all things that are focused on 
thinking about this larger criminal justice system that we have. 
 
Steve Barnes:  Right.  So right now criminal justice system policing is very much 
in the news.  Everything from police community relations to 
sentencing reform.  And to step back a bit, you are an economist 
by training so if you could, please, talk a little bit about how your 
work informs the study of crime, courts, and legal policy. 
 
Paul Heaton:  Great.  Yeah.  I think there's a number of ways.  But I think one of 
the big challenges that we face in the criminal justice world right 
now is just building the evidence that we need to understand how 
to solve some of these big problems.  So you're absolutely right 
that there is a huge amount of public conversation, and discussion 
in the media concerned by policymakers about things like racial 
profiling, or potential racial bias about wrongful conviction 
another big issue. 
 
 But the question becomes, once we become concerned about these 
issues as a practical matter, what do we do to actually resolve 
them?  And one of the things that you get as about how do we 
actually measure the effects of some sort of policy or practicing on 
outcomes that we care about?  So if we put some sort of new rules 
in place for the police, will that actually affect racial profiling and 
racial bias?  Or, if we make modifications to the criminal code 
what sort of impact would that have?  And so a lot of my research 
is focused on getting data and conducting analyses that would 
allow us to clearly understand consequences of different policy 
choices we might make. 
 
 So you can think of it as essentially helping policymakers to 
understand, to the extent that were concerned about these 
problems, what are the things that we can actually do to remedy 
them?  And of course, we need good evidence that we need data 
and analysis because a lot of what happens in criminal justice goes 
up by anecdote.  You know if something sounds good and so we'll 
just try it out and claim that it works well without rigorously trying 
to measure and assess. 
 
Steve Barnes:  So could you give us an example please some of your recent, or 
past work, informing the criminal justice system, or public policy 
in that way? 
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Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  Let me give you one example from here in Philadelphia.  So 
I think if you were to talk with criminal defendants, so first of all 
the vast majority of them don't have enough money to afford their 
own attorney, and so they are given an attorney.  And in the United 
States we have two predominant ways of doing that.  Sometimes 
we have public defenders, so systems – a system whereby we have 
an office of professionals who all they do is they do indigent 
defense for a living.  They are salaried.  We have one here in 
Philadelphia called the Defender Association.   
 
 And the other predominant method is what's called appointed a 
private counsel.  So we take attorneys who have their own private 
practice and we pull them in and on a one-off basis we say okay, 
here.  The court is going to essentially hire you to represent this 
indigent defendant, and to provide counsel.  So I think most 
criminal defendants would say, you know, public defenders are 
terrible.  We don't think they are very good.  We don't think they 
provide good representation, and there is this common perception 
that public defenders aren't as good as private lawyers. 
 
 That actually became a topic of litigation here in Philadelphia.  In 
fact, Prof. Rudolph ski was involved in this because there was 
concerns about quality of counsel that were being provided to 
defendants.  And here in Philadelphia it was actually defendants in 
murder cases.  So you know very serious charges, potentially life 
imprisonment or death on the line.  So we probably care about 
having a system that provides people with capable counsel. 
 
 So I conducted a study with a colleague, James Anderson, where 
we actually got information from thousands of murder cases and 
were able to compare the performance of public defenders to 
private appointed counsel.  And what we discovered, and I won't 
go into all the archaic institutional details, of course.  But what we 
were able to discover and that is after isolating, and I think what 
economist or researchers would say is a very convincing 
experimental way, what the impacts of the attorney's work, public 
defenders were actually far more effective at representing their 
clients. 
 
 So they reduce the probability of a murder conviction by about 20 
percent.  They reduced to the expected time served that their 
clients would spend – time spent in jail, by about 25 percent.  So 
this is, you know, several years off the sentence.  And then, we 
were able to trace and understand what the methods that the public 
defenders did; why they were providing better representation.  
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Partially, as a result of this research, as well as some of the 
litigation, Philadelphia has actually changed its method of 
compensating appointed attorneys in order to try and reduce that 
disparity.  So this is an example where there's kind of a common 
belief; public defenders are terrible, and when you actually 
subjected to empirical analysis, quite the opposite turns out to be 
true.  And once you understand that it provides you with a way to 
improve the system and reduce disparity, in this case, by trying to 
find methods to improve the performance of the private appointed 
attorneys. 
 
Steve Barnes:  That's a great example.  Thank you.  So to look at what might be 
arguably a thornier issue, you mentioned one of your newer studies 
was examining some of the issues around community policing.  
Could you talk about that a little bit, please?  
 
Paul Heaton:  It's interesting.  So community policing has become fairly 
widespread at this point.  It became popular particularly during the 
1990s and the spread of this model was helped by a number of 
federal grant programs.  And you know, when people say 
community policing, often they mean different things.  But one of 
the interesting things is if you're actually look at the empirical 
research and there's actually very little evidence that would tell us 
convincingly that if we had to similar departments and one 
implements community policing and the other doesn't that they 
would have different outcomes, be it in crime, be it in satisfaction 
with the police, whatever.  And so I am doing a study which 
actually looks at community policing events which are widespread.  
They have them in many departments, certainly here locally and 
across the country, and tries to understand better, is there an actual 
measurable impact of these types of activities on crime.   
 
Steve Barnes:  For example, what do you mean by community policing events?  
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  So it's fairly common for police departments to stage kind 
of public events, festivals, gatherings where they do 
demonstrations, where they do crime awareness, where they meet 
with people and tell them about crime patterns in the community.  
And despite the fact that when you talk to police chiefs, you know, 
they say oh yeah, we think these are really well.  If you actually 
asked, you know, have you tried to measure what these do, the 
answer is well, no, that's impossible.  Because there's all sorts of 
things that feed into crime besides these events.  But we think we 
have a methodology which is actually going to allow us to measure 
the effects of these events.  And so that's what we're working on. 
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Steve Barnes:  You also mention some innovative approaches in Texas and North 
Carolina.  Could you expound a little bit about that, please? 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  Sure.  So this is a study of something called open file 
discovery.  So I think that a lot of people don't actually have a very 
clear idea of how criminal cases work in terms of information.  I 
think we typically think that the police do an investigation and 
maybe we do ballistics and forensics, and both sides, both the 
defense and the prosecutors have equal access to that information, 
and they kind of evaluate the evidence, and then the case moves 
forward. 
 
 And the reality is far different.  The prosecutor has its case and its 
cards, and the defense attorney doesn't necessarily have access to 
much of the information the prosecutor has.  And as a result of that 
information silently, there is a potential for mistakes, or error.  One 
thing that you might be concerned about is that a prosecutor might 
have exculpatory information, so information that would – which 
might point to the innocence of the defendant, but they might not – 
that might be kind of reluctant to share that.   
 
 As a result of the Supreme Court case, Brady v. Maryland, they are 
required to share that with the defense, but there is a lot of 
instances where we see evidence that that hasn't occurred.  So if we 
were to look at the registry of exonerations, many cases involving 
wrongful conviction are cases where the prosecution had some sort 
of information that they might have shared, but they kind of didn't, 
and that turned out to be problematic. 
 
 So open file discovery is a policy response to that, and that 
basically sets as the default, hey prosecutor, you just have to take 
all the contents of your file, so whatever you get from the police, 
information From witnesses, and just open the books out and let 
the defense examine it.  That's potentially a powerful way to avoid 
these types of water called Brady violations and improve 
information sharing.  But it could have some costs.  So prosecutors 
in some cases are concerned that if they make too much 
information about the case available it could lead to witness 
intimidation or tampering with evidence. 
 
 No one has empirically studied this to actually see, you know, 
people raising these concerns via anecdote, but there actually 
hasn't been an analysis to say okay.  Well, if we were to implement 
these policies, is there really more witness tampering?  Affect, you 
know, the calculus of negotiations between the prosecutor and 
defense?  And so we have some data from Ohio, North Carolina, 
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and Texas which have implemented these types of policies and 
we're engaged in an empirical study to try and better understand 
what these actually do.  And hopefully, you know, the benefit of 
that sort of research would be there are other jurisdictions which 
you have thought about this and right now they have to decide 
whether they want to implement the policy without really 
understanding clearly what's likely to be the result.  And with this 
research they can have better evidence as to what this will actually 
do. 
 
Steve Barnes:  So in the Texas and North Carolina cases, or studies, are you 
working just independently?  Or, are you working in cooperation 
with prosecutor's office is that there and the defenders are there? 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  So I mean it's a combination.  So the actual empirical 
analysis we're doing largely independently.  But obviously with 
any study of this sort you want to go just beyond the number 
crunching and also try and understand, to the extent that you find 
interesting patterns what are the institutional features that can 
explain those.  And so that will, of necessity, involve having 
conversations with both prosecutors and defenders in those 
jurisdictions. 
 
Steve Barnes:  That's great.  So taking a look at some of the studies you've 
completed.  So you're going to be publishing a new study soon 
about victim compensation funds following incidents of massive 
violence.  As you explain what that study is about and what some 
of the highlights and key findings are, please? 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  Sure.  So victim compensation funds are special funds that 
get set up where we provide typically one-time payments to people 
who have been injured in certain events.   So a few prominent 
examples include after 9/11 there as a special fund that was set up 
by the government to pay out compensation to people who were 
killed in the 9/11 attacks.  After the Boston Marathon bombing 
there were a number of charitable donations that were accumulated 
into a fund of, if I remember correctly, about $60 million, which 
was then disbursed to victims.   
 
 Now, these phones are kind of interesting from the perspective of 
the legal scholar because normally when people are injured, we 
don't come up with some sort of special fund to pay them.  We 
have a tort system for dealing with that. 
 
Steve Barnes:  And could you define just tort system for our listeners?  
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Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  So you have the opportunity in civil court to seek 
reimbursement for your injury from whoever you think was 
responsible.  And so that, you know, if you and I get in a car 
accident we don't develop a special fund.  When people are injured 
in crime that typically sue the person who is responsible, if that 
person is able to.   
 
 And so this study was designed to try and better understand.  So in 
situations where we institute one of these funds, how does that 
affect people's behavior?  Does it make them more or less willing 
to pursue lawsuits?  One reason that's important is because 
increasingly companies and other organizations may turn in the 
future to these types of funds.  So think about the BP oil spill.  
They set up a specialized claims facility.  GM, with the recent 
challenges it's had with respect to the ignition systems, they've 
tried to channel people who were injured into a special fund rather 
than – and discourage them from suing GM.   
 
 And so there's some interesting questions about what these funds 
actually do to people's opinion.  So in the study, what we did is we 
actually ran an experiment where we presented people with a 
scenario involving a shooting in a stadium; and because we 
designed the experiment, we were actually able to vary whether or 
not there was a fond, and how much compensation it provided.  
And then we could compare how people behave.  Whether or not 
they would pursue litigation, et cetera, depending on whether a 
fund existed. 
 
 And then we compared the results that we got from our 
experimental study to the actual observed behavior in about a 
dozen or so major incidents like the 9/11 fund, like the Oklahoma 
City bombing, the Colorado theatre shootings, et cetera, where 
funds have actually been in place, and we can observe something 
about the litigation.   
 
Steve Barnes:  And can you reveal the results, or is it – 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah, sure.  Absolutely.  I mean I think there are a number of 
interesting things.  So it probably comes as no surprise that when 
people get compensation through one of these funds, it does reduce 
their willingness to pursue lawsuits, and that makes sense.  But I 
think one of the interesting results was that even in situations 
where people were fully compensated for the cost of their injuries.  
A substantial fraction, a bit more than half, still indicated they 
wanted to pursue lawsuits.  And if you look at people's reasoning, 
they feel that litigation serves a lot of purposes beyond just 
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compensation.  They want to hold people responsible, and they 
want to be able to encourage proactive measures in the future that 
would prevent such tragedies from occurring again. 
 
 And so, you know, I think that the bottom line is that these funds 
can be a valuable tool in managing litigation.  But there is still 
going to be – the tort system does other things besides just 
providing payments.  And it seems that that these types of funds 
probably can't replicate those sort of benefits that victims are 
looking for.   
 
Steve Barnes:  Right.  Just as a side question, so if a person, or people except 
funds – except financial compensation through one of these funds, 
is there federal law in terms – governing how, and whether they 
can still file suit against the – 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  That's a great question.  It actually varies from fund to fund.  
So the 9/11 fund, for example, in order to participate in the fund 
you had to waive your ability to pursue a lawsuit.  But for the BP 
fund there was one element of the fund that requires waivers.  But 
many of them do not.  So the Virginia Tech shooting, for example, 
you could take the money from the fund, and if you wanted to turn 
around, pay an attorney, and sue Virginia Tech. 
 
 And I think one of the interesting things you saw in Virginia Tech 
is that that there were actually very few lawsuits against the 
university.  And some people have attributed that to the fund 
essentially providing payments and allowing people to have 
closure and move on without needing to resort to a costly and, you 
know, very prolonged process of litigation. 
 
Steve Barnes:  That's great.  You also done some studies at the state level in terms 
of liability litigation related to – getting away from a little less 
tragic space here.  In terms of how people's ability to sue impacts 
the cost of auto insurance.  Could you explain a little bit about 
what that study – what was focused on and what states are 
involved, and what the findings were, please? 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah, sure.  So this is – I've done a number of studies thinking 
about how the various features of tort law, so the rules we make 
about who can sue who and under what circumstances and how 
that affects ordinary consumers.  So auto insurance is regulated on 
a state-by-state basis and each state has a different rules about 
when lawsuits can occur.  Here in Pennsylvania, for example, it's 
kind of an interesting place.  You have the choice, as part of your 
auto insurance policy, you can choose to say I'm not going to 
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pursue lawsuits under certain circumstances.  And in return you get 
a lowered insurance premium.  Not all states are like that.  Some 
states you don't have the choice, and there's just an automatic limit 
on lawsuits.  And you have to take that.  So this study was one that 
was designed to try and understand, if you put different rules in 
place regarding who can sue. So one particular – one that a number 
of states have thought about recently is so-called no-fault.  So it's 
this limitation on lawsuits that I just described. 
 
 Does that actually affect consumers pocketbooks?  And this might 
be an interesting thing to understand because if you're in a state 
that has no fault insurance, Michigan and Florida, and New York 
are three prominent examples, and you're thinking about hey, do 
we want to change the rules, you kind of like to know hey, if I 
were to change my no-fault rules in Michigan, are people actually 
going to save money from that?  And prior to this study that was 
not really very clear. 
 
 And so for this study we actually got data on hundreds of 
thousands of individual consumers and had information about how 
much they pay on auto insurance.  Then we did comparisons across 
consumers in different states over time because some states have 
changed their regulations to see when you implement a change 
how do your auto insurance premiums change relative to places 
that had a more stable policy regime?   
 
 And what we found is that a number of the different tort reform is 
that people talk about, for example, what are called damage caps or 
limits on the maximum amount that can be paid out in a lawsuit, 
didn't actually have much measurable effect.  But one of the big 
things that did have an effect was whether or not you have one of 
these no-fault versus a traditional tort system.  So do you have a 
system that automatically limits on lawsuits, or do you have kind 
of a more traditional freefall where anyone can sue anyone? 
 
Steve Barnes:  Right.  So in the no-fault case, what's was the big take away? 
 
Paul Heaton:  Well, ironically, what it turns out is that that getting rid of no-fault 
actually saves people money.  And you know there's a lot of 
reasons for that, and I've actually written a book about that, so I 
won't bore you with all of the details.  But, you know, no-fault 
laws were put in place in the 70s in kind of a different 
environment.  And they initially worked well in constraining costs.  
But over time, plaintiff attorneys and others have figured out how 
to adapt to the legal regimes such that they tend to provide higher 
benefits to injured drivers, but actually not do a very good job at 
CASE IN POINT PODCAST_  
 HOW CAN ECONOMICS BE APPLIED TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM Page 10 of 15 
Steve Barnes, Paul Heaton 
www.verbalink.com  Page 10 of 15 
limiting lawsuits.  So it turns out that under no fault you can kind 
of collect wants from your insurer, and then still pursue a lawsuit 
and collect again in many cases.  And so as a result, the no-fault 
regimes have become more expensive.  And when you make 
changes and move more towards traditional tort, it actually saves 
consumers money. 
 
 Now, you know, I think you have to be careful about that because 
you know the consumers are getting some benefits in terms of 
additional payments and things when you're injured.  And so you 
want to weigh those benefits against the additional costs in terms 
of premiums.  But I think it's a very important for policy makers to 
understand what reforms will actually affect cost and which ones 
probably won't.  And this research helps to identify that. 
 
Steve Barnes:  Fantastic.  Great.  And you've done some other insurance studies as 
well.  Could you talk a little bit about those, please?  One or two 
examples?  
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  One area where I continue to do active research actually 
relates to the Affordable Care Act.  So you know with the 
Affordable Care Act we think of it as being an act which has to do 
with health insurance, which it certainly is.  It's about expanding 
health insurance coverage, but it turns out there's lots of other 
insurance products that we don't think so much about that actually 
pay for medical care.  So your auto insurance is a great example.  
You may not realize it, but there's probably a provision of your 
auto insurance that says when you're injured in an auto accident the 
first pay or is going to be your auto insurance, not your health 
insurance. 
 
 Workers compensation is another example.  If we're injured here at 
Pen on the job, it isn't necessarily our private health insurance that 
begins to pay the medical costs for the injuries, it's the workers 
compensation insurance that Pen takes out for all of its employees.  
So there's been very little analysis that has thought beyond the 
health care system to some of these other insurance systems, 
workers comp, homeowners insurance, auto insurance, despite the 
fact that whenever you make big changes to the health care system, 
there may very well be trickle-down impacts on these other 
insurance products.  So I have a series of studies which have 
actually tried to measure and assess, is there any evidence that the 
changes that are being initiated under the Affordable Care Act, and 
particularly the coverage expansion components, what implications 
will those have four workers, for medical malpractice insurance?  
For auto insurance? 
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 And in some cases, there does seem to be evidence that that there 
may be some impacts.  Fortunately, in many cases, they appear as 
though they are going to be in a cost-saving direction for 
consumers.  So for example, there's some evidence to suggest that 
that auto insurance costs may go down as we expand health 
coverage.  And the basic logic you can think of there is as we 
provide are different places for people to have their medical care 
covered, then they are going to be less reliant on any one particular 
source of payment, including their auto insurance. 
 
Steve Barnes:  I'm glad you mentioned a medical malpractice.  So malpractice, the 
Affordable Care Act, no-fault insurance, all of these in addition to 
being insurance topics are political hot button issues.  So two 
questions I guess, please.  One, as a researcher, how do you 
approach should these issues that have great weight in the public 
sphere in terms of how policymakers and politicians that deal with 
them, talk about them to the public, and amongst each other?  And 
second, I'm just very curious to find out what your study revealed 
in terms of medical malpractice reform on emergency department 
care.  It's a study you did somewhat recently. 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah, sure.  So you know in terms of the policy discussion you're 
absolutely right that there's a lot of these topics that are very 
controversial.  But in a lot of ways I think that's the best place for 
us to be working as researchers, or, at least, as empirical 
researchers.  Because the tendency in our public discourse, I think, 
is when we feel very passionate or ideological about some 
particular issue, we want to just kind of toss evidence out the 
window and say, you know, hey, we think that Obama care is bad.  
Or we think that it's fantastic.   
 
 And I believe that in peer go research can provide a sort of 
discipline to the policy discourse.  You know, there's that famous 
quote by Daniel Patrick Moynihan that, you know, have your own 
opinion, but you can't have your own facts.  And I view one of the 
roles that we have as researchers as providing objective facts to 
help inform these conversations where otherwise it might be a kind 
of passion and ideology that carry the day. 
 
 So you asked about the medical malpractice research.  So this is 
actually research which is designed to tackle a question which has 
occurred repeatedly in front of Congress, and in individual states.  
And this has to do with a particular problem of the cost of 
healthcare in the United States.  So we obviously spend a huge 
fraction of GDP on healthcare, and there's a lot of reasons for that, 
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but one reason that some people have pointed to is what's called 
defensive medicine.  So they argue that doctors are concerned 
about being sued for malpractice, and as a result, they will do 
procedures or tests which are not clinically necessary, but which 
are designed to shield them from liability. 
 
 And if you look at surveys of doctors, a substantial fraction, 60 
percent or more say that they routinely engage in these types of 
defensive medicine activities.  And so one thing that's been 
proposed as a policy solution is well, what if we implement some 
shields for liability to physicians.  Is that a way to get them to stop 
doing all of these unnecessary wasteful tests?  And some 
organizations have estimated that those types of reforms can save 
hundreds of billions, billions with a B, dollars per year.  So a lot of 
money potentially on the line. 
 
 So in the study I did we actually examined a couple of states which 
implemented very strong liability shields for emergency 
department physicians. 
 
Steve Barnes:  Which one, may I ask?  
 
Paul Heaton:  We focused on Texas, Georgia, South Carolina, among others.  
And in this study, we had access to wonderful data comprising 
millions and millions of Medicare claims with detailed information 
about the sort of procedures; what sort of test they did on each 
patient, et cetera.  And so we were actually able to look in the data 
and say okay, if we take Georgia, and if it implements that this 
liability shield, is there evidence that physicians actually stop 
doing the unnecessary tests, et cetera?  So in other words is this 
going to actually save us money? 
 
 Unfortunately, the answer in our analysis, which was published in 
the New England Journal of Medicine, is not really.  People do 
about the same stuff after you implement these shields.  And our 
interpretation of that is while malpractice reform might be one 
piece of the puzzle, apparently, it's not the whole piece.  There may 
be cultural influences, the training physicians receive, or other 
things that are also guiding these decisions.  And you know, I think 
that that's important to understand and it suggests that it's a simple 
change to the court system might not panacea that people are 
looking at in terms of reducing burgeoning healthcare costs. 
 
Steve Barnes:  Staying in healthcare for a moment, but branching out a bit.  
You've also done some studies of information technology's impact 
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on healthcare, as well as public sector reform.  Could you discuss 
that a little bit, please? 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  Sure.  So in the healthcare space one of the papers that I've 
published in this area is designed to confront a particular puzzle 
that has arisen in the research community, and it has to do with the 
effects of health information technology.  So things like 
computerized medical records, or computerized drug ordering 
system.  So there is a lot of evidence said that these types of 
information technology capabilities have become much more 
widespread in hospitals and in doctors' offices.  But there doesn't 
seem to necessarily be a lot of evidence said that this is actually 
making healthcare more productive, or lowering costs. 
 
 And so the question is why is that?  Why are we making all of 
these investments and not seeming to get much of a return?  And 
the answer that we point to in our research is that this is actually 
part of the historic adoption pattern of information technology.  
And if we look at the experience of other industries, we actually 
had a similar thing happened.   
 
 So when information technology was introduced in banking, for 
example, initially lots of computerization.  But it was – we weren't 
seeing in measures of bank productivity any evidence that it was 
improving things.  And there's a number of reasons for that.  
Things like how do we measure productivity, and in healthcare 
that's particularly difficult.  But I think one of the key takeaways is 
the experience of other industries suggests that the information 
technology along isn't enough.  It takes a quiet to work out the 
kinks and develop systems that are user-friendly.   
 
 You also have to couple the information technology investments 
with what I would call managerial, or organizational changes.  So 
you need to change your work processes and how you structure 
lines of authority, for example, in a way that takes advantage of the 
new information.  And until you do both of those things, have the 
computers and make the kind of organizational and managerial 
change, you're not really going to reap the benefits.  I think the 
good news is that the experience of other industries suggests that 
even though right now we might not be seeing a big productivity 
benefit from these investments, there is reason to be optimistic that 
a few years down the road when hospitals and doctors' offices and 
other healthcare providers have had a chance to better incorporate 
the technologies and make some of these other changes, that 
indeed we are going to be able to see some important benefits of 
the technology investments. 
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Steve Barnes:  Great.  Staying both, I guess in healthcare, but also with political, 
or social hot button issues, you've also done a study of recent 
medical marijuana laws with recreational marijuana use.  Could 
you talk about that a bit, please? 
 
Paul Heaton:  Yeah.  So medical marijuana is obviously a very interesting issue, 
and it's one that is increasingly able to be studied because of course 
there's a lot of jurisdictions now which are implementing medical 
marijuana.  And if you like Colorado, which are just outright 
legalizing recreational marijuana.  And there's obviously a lot of 
interest in the public health community, among the public 
policymakers in trying to understand what the implications of these 
new types of rules are. 
 
 So my empirical research tries to look at outcomes that are linked 
to, or potentially linked to marijuana use to try and better 
understand what the impacts of these laws are. 
 
 It turns out that one of the interesting things about medical 
marijuana, and marijuana more generally, is probably a lot of the 
public health impact hinges on whether or not marijuana and 
alcohol, or what economists would call substitutes, or 
compliments.  Which is to say, when we make marijuana more 
widely available, do people consume more alcohol, or do they 
consume less alcohol?  Or is there no impact. 
 
 The reason why is that it turns out that alcohol is very bad for lots 
of public health outcomes.  We get in lots of car accidents as a 
result of alcohol use.  There's lots of violence as a result of alcohol 
use.  People have a lot of health conditions that are linked to 
alcohol use.  And so if you are able to reduce alcohol consumption 
through any means, potentially that could have public health 
benefits.  To date, there hasn't been great evidence as to whether or 
not liberalizing access to marijuana affects alcohol use.  And so in 
our analysis we've tried to look at various data sets, and various 
outcomes to better understand that. 
 
 I would say for that research the jury is still out.  But there's some 
indication that, in fact, they may be substitutes.  The so that 
actually liberalizing marijuana access reduces alcohol consumption 
and may lead to some public health benefits, interestingly enough.   
 
Steve Barnes:  Right.  So just so I understand that.  For individuals who use 
marijuana recreationally, and potentially a lot of it, your study and 
the public health debate actually focuses more on whether or not 
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people consume alcohol more as a result of their marijuana use.  
Am I following that correctly? 
 
Paul Heaton:  That's certainly been an important question in the debate.  And the 
reason why is, let's take something like impaired driving.  It turns 
out that the evidence suggest that you don't get impaired in the 
same way when you've used marijuana then when you use alcohol.  
And people are much less likely to use marijuana and get behind 
the wheel.  And so for something whether or not I cause a car 
accident, even though marijuana may have other negative health 
consequences, for that particular outcome probably alcohol was a 
lot worse.  And so that substitute ability then becomes particularly 
important. 
 
 Now, obviously, it's possible that increasing use of marijuana can 
have other longer-term impacts, cancer, et cetera.  And you know, 
I would say those are open questions that we don't necessarily 
understand very well at this point. 
 
Steve Barnes:  Well, Paul, thank you very much.  This has been a fascinating 
conversation.  And your work is extremely interesting for a 
number of different reasons, up to and including the fact that a lot 
of the study's conclusions you've discussed sort of seem to defy 
conventional wisdom a little bit. 
 
 So we really appreciate you being here on broadcast and hope you 
will come back again sometime soon to talk about your latest 
projects. 
 
Paul Heaton:  Thanks for having me. 
 
Steve Barnes:  Thank you.  And thanks very much for joining this episode of Case 
in Point. 
  
[End of Audio] 
 
 
